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Within the past few years an alteration has been made in our
system of legal remedies for which very great claims have been
made by its advocates. It is so well known as to make the state-
ment almost superfluous, that at common law an agreement to
arbitrate is not specifically enforceable and may be disregarded
by either party. While it is true that such an agreement was
not regarded as positively illegal and damages could be had
for its breach, yet such damages were vague and indefinite and
in at least one instance recovery was denied on that ground. 2
The reasons which led the courts to refuse to enforce arbi-
t ation agreements are not now germane. While the judges may
have felt that justice would be done in all causes coming be-
fore them and therefore arbitrations were unnecessary and per-
haps mischievous, the fact must not be overlooked that the com-
mon law rule in substance voided all arbitration agreements,
no matter how deliberately entered into. In other words, the
parties were encouraged to repudiate their engagements.
This defect in the law was remedied in England by an Act
passed in 1854,2 now superseded by the Arbitration Act of
1889. 3 The British system of enforcing arbitration agreements
did not, however, commend itself to our legislators, for it was
not until 1920 that a statute making an agreement to arbitrate
specifically enforceable was passed in New York. On Feb-
ruary 12, 1925, the Federal Act, patterned after the New York
Act, was passed.
Our federal government has, of course, only a limited juris-
diction in the premises. The Constitution, however, entrusts
to it the regulation of interstate commerce and bestows upon
the federal courti admiralty jurisdiction. The Federal Act is
limited to these matters.
The scope of the statute is defined as follows :"
"That 'maritime transactions,' as herein defined, means charter
parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to
'IMunson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 99 Fed. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1900).
2 (1854) 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125 (Common Law Proc. Act, § 11).
3 (1889) 52 & 53 Viet., c. 49.
4 N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 275.
5Act of Feb. 12, 1925, 43 Stat. 883. This statute did not takle effect





wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, col-
lisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the
subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty
jurisdiction; 'commerce,' as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any
Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
or between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
The above quoted section is the most unsatisfactory part of
the statute. In particular, there is evident confusion in defining
admiralty matters as to which arbitration is made compulsory.
A much happier result would have been reached if the first
part had read "that maritime transactions include all matters
which if the subject of controversy would be embraced within
admiralty jurisdiction," instead of as the section now reads. As
it is, certain classes of disputes of acknowledged admiralty juris-
diction are included, whereas others are apparently excluded; the
draftsman was also apparently under the erroneous impression
that admiralty jurisdiction did not exist unless foreign commerce
was involved.7
An illustration will give point to the deficiencies of the section
as it now reads. Let us suppose that salvage services are ren-
dered an American vessel off the coast of the United States. The
amount of a salvage award is easily susceptible of arbitration;
and yet it would seem that such an agreement might not fall
within the statute unless under the circumstances the rendering
of the service amounted to "foreign commerce." Let us suppose
again that a tug is hired to tow a barge from New York to Brook-
lyn, or within the limits of Boston harbor. There is every rea-
son why the Arbitration Act should apply to such a contract
and yet, apparently through oversight, it has been excluded. The
statute also omits all reference to marine insurance, a subject
matter of acknowledged admiralty jurisdiction.
It might be said that such agreements as do not fall within
the Act will be taken care of by like acts which will presumably
be passed by the various states. As will be pointed out later,
however, the decisions leave this question of conflict between the
state and the federal acts in a very unsatisfactory condition; there
will probably be a number of controversies which are not covered
by either and it will no doubt often be difficult to determine in
which category the controversy falls.
The procedure which is outlined in the Act seems admirably
7 See Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, 3 Sup. Ct. 434 (1884).
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to achieve the result intended." Especially to be mentioned is
the provision 9 that in an admiralty suit when property has been
attached, the arbitration may continue during the pendency of
the suit and the court's decree shall be entered upon the award.
The obvious purpose of this section is to cover cases where one
party is a foreigner. If he were free to take his property from
the jurisdiction pending the arbitration, the rendering of an
award might, in a number of cases, be entirely fruitless. Some
such provision was obviously necessary to insure that payment
would be made.
It should be noted also 10 that, generally speaking, the award
can be upset only in cases of misconduct on the part of the ar-
bitrators, which misconduct may be altogether innocent. Proof
of corruption or fraud obviously will result in upsetting the
award. The award may also be vacated where the arbitrators
refuse to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or
refuse to hear "evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy"; or are guilty of "any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced." An imperfect award
may also be set aside and, if the time within which the award
must be made has not elapsed, the court has discretion to direct
a rehearing.
In New York, where there is a similar statute, it has been held
that where an arbitrator made an independent investigation of
the facts without consultation of the parties, this was miscon-
duct justifying the setting aside of the award.1'
It has been thought by some people that once an arbitration
statute is passed, all technicalities would be done away with and
every controversy would be promptly decided on its merits. Un-
fortunately this is not the case. Disputes, which would be bit-
terly contested in court, will in all probability be likewise con-
tested in arbitration proceedings. If a party believes that he can
s Section 2 provides in substance that a written arbitration agreement
within the scope of the Act shall be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."
Section 3 gives the court the right to stay an action brought in violation
of an arbitration agreement.
Section 4 covers the specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement and
section 5 provides for the appointment of the arbitrators. In appointing
an arbitrator or arbitrators the court must follow the method prescribed
in the agreement to arbitrate; if no method is prescribed, then the court
may designate any arbitrator it may wish.
Sections 6 and 7 are purely procedural covering the summoning of wit-
nesses and applications to the court, which are to be heard as motions.
9 Section 8.
10 Sections 9, 10 and 11 deal with the confirmation, upsetting or modifica-
tion of the award.
1L Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925).
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obtain an advantage by a technicality, he will avail himself of it
irrespective of the tribunal. This is shown by the records of
the courts which contain many instances of litigation under ar-
bitration agreements having little or nothing to do with the
merits.
Experience with the New York Act shows the classes of ques-
tions which are likely to arise and in view of the similarity of
the two acts, it would seem that decisions under the New York
Act were authoritative in the construction of the federal statute.
In the first place, the United States Act provides that agreements
to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable. Suppose
that 6ne party to such an agreement brings suit against the other,
who files an answer without relying upon the arbitration clause.
May either party later, without the consent of the other, insist
on arbitration? After some fluctuation of opinion, the New York
courts have come to the conclusion that a party who wishes to
avail himself of arbitration must do so promptly. If his con-
duct indicates a preference for litigation, he cannot later change
his mind. 2 The result reached is obviously based on common
sense and it is to be expected that the federal statute will be in-
terpreted in the same way.
Secondly, suppose that the arbitration agreement provides for
an arbitration outside of the United States, as is very common
in maritime transactions. It is quite clear that a United States
court could hardly specifically enforce such an agreement, as the
machinery provided in the Act contemplates the control of the
arbitration by the United States District Court. 3 On the other
hand, the court might conceivably stay the suit under the pro-
vision of section 3 until arbitration was had in the foreign juris-
diction. It is, however, doubtful if a court could, or should,
grant a stay to await the termination of an arbitration over
which it would have little or no control. Almost every section
of the Act seems to contemplate an arbitration taking place
in the United States and it would seem going very far to say
that a stay should be granted under section 3, although the agree-
ment provided for arbitration elsewhere. On the other hand,
it has been held in New York, though not by a court of last
resort, that a stay will be granted although the arbitration is to
take place in a foreign jurisdiction.1 4
Thirdly, the question has arisen as to the course to pursue
where one party wishes to arbitrate and the other refuses.
Section 4 of the Act provides "That a party aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
12 Matter of Zimmerman & Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923).
"3 See § 7.
14 Matter of Inter-ocean Food Products, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426, 201
N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dept. 1923).
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a written agreement for arbitration m.y petition any court of
the United States which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction for an order directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement" [our
italics]. If we suppose that the arbitration agreement is drawn
so as to be self-executing, i. e., so that it is unnecessary to compel
the other party to take any action in order to have the arbi-
tration proceed, must resort still be had to the courts?
Curiously enough, this situation has come before the House
of Lords under section 3 of the New York Act, which is practi-
cally identical with the Federal Act.Y5 The action was to enforce
an award made in New York under an agreement between two
insurance companies. After disputes had arisen, the American
company proposed arbitration, but the English company refused
to take any part therein. The American company thereupon
appointed both arbitrators, as it was entitled to do by the terms
of the contract. After the award had been made, it was disputed
by the English company on a number of grounds, among which
was that the American company should have applied to the New
York courts in accordance with section 3.
The difficulty of the question is emphasized by the divergent
opinions of the judges, the Court of Appeal reversing the lower
court and being, in turn, reversed by the House of Lords. During
the pendency of the action, there happened to take place a meet-
ing of the American Bar Association in London. This opportun-
ity was availed of to obtain the opinions of many prominent
American lawyers as to the meaning of the New York statute.
Their opinions, which were made a part of the case, were also
widely divergent. In the House of Lords the decision of the
New York Court of Appeals in Bullard v. Grace Co,1; which
had been handed down after the decision in the lower courts, was
relied upon as showing that an application to the court was
necessary. Consequently, the arbitration proceedings were set
aside. This case, together with many others, illustrates the
fact that the passage of the Arbitration Act has by no means
done away with technicalities.
Conflicts between the federal and state laws will undoubtedly
arise in the future. If interstate commerce is involved, then of
course arbitration must take place in accordance with the Fed-
eral Act. So if the subject matter is within the admiralty juris-
diction, relief in accordance with the United States Act must
be sought. Difficulty will often arise in solving this question
of jurisdiction. Very many contracts are on the border line
between intra- and inter-state transactions. In the same way,
v; Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Liverpool Marine Ins. Co., 24
Lloyds List L. Rep. 85 (H. L. 1925).
', 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559 (1925).
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it is also often difficult to be sure whether a contract is within the
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. In the absence of an arbi-
tration clause, suit in cases of doubt can always be brought at
common law since the common law jurisdiction is substantially
all-embracing. When, however, arbitration is sought, it will
be necessary to be certain which court has jurisdiction. An er-
roneous choice at the outset might result in having all of thQ
proceedings subsequently set aside.
The decisions prior to the Federal Statute are perhaps of some
help in solving these questions of jurisdiction. In any event,
it would seem worth while to refer to the remarkable litigation
arising out of one of the voyages of the steamship Runa.
The Runa, a small Scandinavian steamer, was time-chartered
by her owners to the Atlantic Fruit Company, which company,
in turn, sub-chartered her to the Red Cross Line. During one
of her voyages she met with stormy weather with the result
that she deviated from her course, causing serious loss to the
Red Cross Line. The Red Cross Line presented its claim to the
Atlantic Fruit Company, which rejected it. The Red Cross Line
then demanded arbitration in New York in accordance with one
of the clauses of the charter party. The Atlantic Fruit Com-
pany refused to arbitrate, suggesting that the Red Cross Line
should bring suit against it in admiralty, which would afford the
Atlantic Fruit Company the opportunity of impleading, in ac-
cordance with the admiralty practice, the steamer and her
owners, so that if an obligation were found to exist, it could be
passed on to the party which ought to bear it. However, for
reasons which seemed good to it, the Red Cross Line insisted on
arbitration, and brought suit in a New York state court under
the New York Arbitration Law to compel arbitration. The At-
lantic Fruit Company resisted on the ground that the charter
party was a maritime contract and that the remedy given in
judicial proceedings was exclusive. This contention of the At-
lantic Fruit Company was upheld by the New York Court of
Appeals.27
However, the case was taken further with the result that the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding I that
despite the admiralty nature of the controversy, a remedy might
be obtained under the New York Arbitration Law. The conclu-
sion of the Supreme Court is based on the following grounds: 19
"By reason of the saving clause, state courts have jurisdiction
in personam, concurrent with the admiralty courts, of all causes
17 Matter of Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 233 N. Y. 373, 135
N. E. 821 (1922).
18 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274
(1924).
19 At 123, 44 Sup. Ct. at 277.
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of action maritime in their nature arising under charter parties.
Judiciary Act of September, 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77;
Judicial Code, § 24, par. 3; Leon i. Galccran, 11 Wall. 185;
Schoonawker v. Gibnore, 102 U. S. 118; Chappcll r. Bradshaw,
128 U. S. 132; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall, 398, 475. The 'right of a
common law remedy', so saved to suitors, does not, as has been
held in cases which presently will be mentioned, include at-
tempted changes by the States in the substantive admiralty law,
but it does include all means other than proceedings in admiralty
which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the
injury involved. It includes remedies in pals, as well as proceed-
ings in court; judicial remedies conferred by statute, as well as
those existing at the common law; remedies in equity, as well as
those enforceable in a court of law. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. Mc-
Caffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 644, et seq.; Roinzds v. Clovcpoet Foun-
dry & Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303. A State may not provide a
remedy in reim for any cause of action within the admiralty
jurisdiction. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; The Glide, 167
U. S. 606. But otherwise, the State, having concurrent jurisdic-
tion, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such
incidents, as it sees fit. New York, therefore, had the power to
confer upon its courts the authority to compel parties within its
jurisdiction to specifically perform an agreement for arbitration,
which is valid by the general maritime law, as well as by the law
of the State, which is contained in a contract made in New York
and which, by its terms, is to be performed there."
Concluding its opinion, the Supreme Court said:
"As the constitutionality of the remedy provided by New York
for use in its own courts is not dependent upon the practice or
procedure which may prevail in admiralty, we have no occasion
to consider whether the unwillingness of the federal courts to
give full effect to executory agreements for arbitration can be
justified."
This decision settled that a party to a contract containing an
arbitration clause could obtain specific performance through the
state courts even though the contract was one of a maritime
nature. The question, however, still remained open as to
whether, if one of the parties to such a contract preferred to
bring his suit in the federal court, the federal court would allow
the arbitration clause as a defense. This question is answered
in Atlantic Fruit Company v. Red Cross Line,2  a suit to recover
charter hire during the period of the alleged deviation of the
Runa. At the trial the Red Cross Line failed to make good the
defense which it had set up as to the misconduct of the Master,
and the question principally considered on the appeal was as to
the effect of the New York statute as a bar to the suit.
In holding that the New York statute was not a bar, Judge
Hough said: 22
20 At 125, 44 Sup. Ct. at 278.
215 Fed. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
22 At 219-220.
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"The arbitration statute of New York changed the common
law, or at least the common-law method of thinking about arbi-
tration in that state. What New York and other courts regarded
as the 'common-law limitation upon enforcement of promises to
arbitrate' was a part of the law of remedies, which is always a
portion of the law of the forum. Therefore the statute itself
relates altogether to remedies.
"Since The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 22 L. Ed. 654, it seems
superfluous to further discuss the proposition that the states
acting through their Legislature or their courts cannot create
a new remedy enforceable in the admiralty, nor take away any
remedy there already existing. There are instances in which
new substantive legal rights created by the states may be en-
forced by remedies of its own in the admiralty, but it is entirely
plain that this matter of arbitration, whether based on a New
York statute or resting upon traditional and judge-made law, is
wholly matter of remedy.
"We therefore hold that the Arbitration Act of New York,
although affording a remedy in respect of this charter party, has
no effect upon whatever remedy the admiralty offered for the
settlement of disputes arising under the same charter party."
Prior to the federal statute, therefore, the remarkable result
was reached that arbitration of an admiralty controversy could
be specifically enforced in proceedings in the state court, but
that, at the same time, federal courts, sitting in admiralty, would
not admit the arbitration statutes as a defense. The decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals was rendered after that of the
Supreme Court, and consequently must be accepted as the law
today.
While this controversy relating to the Runa has been made
largely academic because of the federal statute, there are still
-certain disputes of admiralty cognizance which it would seem are
not covered by the Federal Act; to these the decisions just noted
would apply.
Another controversial element in the federal statute is the
limited number of grounds on which the decision of the arbi-
trator may be reviewed. In general, it may be said that two
schools of thought exist as to arbitration. One school is in favor
of allowing quite a full review of the result. The other school,
which has found favor in New York and with Congress, con-
siders that an arbitration award should stand unless fraud or
misconduct can be shown. In other words, once the parties have
agreed upon arbitration, they must accept the result the arbi-
trator reaches no matter how obviously and plainly wrong it
appears.
The English Act provides rather elaborately for a judicial
review of the arbitrator's decision, and it will be worth while to
consider briefly the practice under the English Act in order to
compare it with the American. Under the English statute ques-
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tions of law arising in the arbitration may come before the courts
in two ways.
23
By section 19: "Any referee, arbitrator, or umpire may at any
stage of the proceedings under a reference, and shall, if so
,directed by the Court or a judge, state in the form of a special
case for the opinion of the Courts any question of law arising
in the course of the reference."
If an arbitrator or umpire states a case under this section, the
case is referred to a Divisional Court which renders what is
termed a consultative opinion, from which no appeal can be
taken.2 4
Section 7 provides: "The arbitrators or umpire acting under
a submission shall, unless the submission expresses a contrary
contention, have power . . . (b) to state an award as to
the whole or part thereof in the form of a special case for the
opinion of the Court."
Under this section the arbitrators or umpire have absolute
discretion as to whether or not at the termination of their labors
they will state a case for the opinion of the court. Such a case,
when stated, comes first before the King's Bench Division and
an appeal may be taken in ordinary course to the Court of Appeal
and ultimately to the House of Lords. This latter method of
bringing commercial questions before the highest judicial body
in the United Kingdom is frequently availed of. In passing on
a case stated, the judges refuse to review the facts but are free
to differ with the legal conclusions drawhm therefrom by the
arbitrator. It is held to be contrary to public policy for the
parties by their contract to agree to waive a resort to the courts
under the English Arbitration Act.25
This is, of course, not the place to discuss the many nice ques-
lions raised in the English cases, such as that the repudiation
of the substance of a contract disentitles the party so repudiat-
ing to claim arbitration, - or that if a contract is "frustrated,"
the arbitration clause goes with it,2T or that unseaworthiness may
prevent a shipowner claiming arbitration. -s
It has been customary in this country to follow rather closely
the English practice, and an effort may subsequently be made to
alter our Federal Act so as to allow a judicial review of the
arbitrators' conclusions of law. The question will then be pre-
23 See Mitrovitch Bros. & Co. v. Hickson, Ltd., 14 Lloyds List L. Rep. 164
(K. B. 1923).24 Larrinaga & Co. v. Soci&t6 Franco-Americaine, 27 Com. Cas. 160, 161
(1922); Cogstad & Co. v. Newsum Sons & Co. [1921] 2 A. C. 528.
25 Czarnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 K. B. 478.
26 Jureidini v. Nat'l British Ins. Co. [1915] A. C. 499; The Atlanten, 252
U. S. 313, 40 Sup. Ct. 332 (1920).
27 Hirji Mulji v. Cheong S. S. Co., 42 T. L. R. 359 (P. C. 1926).
2 Ford & Co. v. Furness & Co. [1922] 2 K. B. 797.
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sented as to whether it is not better to require the parties to
select arbitrators qualified to decide all of the points in contro-
versy, so that the result reached will, in the absence of mis-
conduct, be final, or whether a suit at law ought in almost all
cases to be superadded to the arbitration proceedings. It is
submitted that the American method of procedure is, in the vast
majority of cases, preferable since the reservation of a right to
review by the courts adds considerably to the potential expense
of the proceedings and is, in substance, adding a fifth wheel
to the wagon. If the parties are not prepared to abide by the
results reached by the arbiters chosen by themselves, it would
seem that they should bring their disputes into court directly.
Of couse there may be cases where large sums are at stake and
it is felt that there should be an opportunity to review the arbi-
trators' decision and to correct any mistakes, inadvertent or
otherwise. In such comparatively rare cases, the arbitration
agreement could well be drawn to provide for a review by a
board of appeal.
The arbitration statutes are now with us, and it is exceedingly
unlikely that they will ever be repealed. They must, therefore,
be studied by lawyers, for clients will wish advice, not only as
to the technical questions involved, but also in general 'as to
the advisability of arbitration as compared with proceedings in
court. A few moments reflection will, it is believed, convince
anyone that in many cases the client should be advised to litigate
rather than to arbitrate. Every case must be considered by it-
self; a general rule cannot be laid down. Of course if a jury
trial must be had and if it is certain that no matter what the
result an appeal, or possibly two appeals, will be taken, with the
possibility of reversals and new trials extending almost ad in-
finitum, then arbitration is much preferable, since the cost of
litigation of that character very soon exceeds the amount in dis-
pute. On the other hand, where the facts will be dealt with by
a trial court and where one appeal will finally dispose of the
case, there are strong arguments against arbitrating.
The procedure in our admiralty courts may be taken as an
example of litigation in its most favorable aspect. An admiralty
case is tried by one of the United States district judges, who
decides both questions of fact and questions of law. If the
amount of damages is liquidated or undisputed, a decree is en-
tered directly on his opinion. If the amount of damages is
disputed, that question is referred to a commissioner, a lawyer
appointed by the court, which may be compared with the practice
of appointing arbitrators under the Arbitration Act. In case the
appointment of a commissioner is necessary, a final decree is
entered upon his report, after confirmation.
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An appeal may be taken from the decision of the District
Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reviews both facts and law, giving great weight to the
conclusion of the District Court, however, as to the facts in
cases where the witnesses have testified in open court. The
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in all but an insignifi-
cant number of cases finally disposes of the controversy one way
or the other. There is a theoretical right of review by petition
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Lnited States,
but such a writ is very rarely granted, and then only in cases
of great moment where large amounts are involved. The Circuit
Court of Appeals also occasionally requires a further assessment
of the damages, if it considers that these have been determined
below on a wrong theory.
The only considerable item of expense is that of printing the
record and testimony for the Circuit Court of Appeals. Against
that must be balanced the fact that the parties do not have to
pay anything to the court, whereas in an arbitration the fees of
the arbitrators often amount to considerable sums.
Limiting the discussion to disputes relating to maritime
matters, it will be seen that the only advantages of arbitration
over litigation are (1) that while the present crowded condition
of our court calendars continues, a result can probably be
reached more quickly in arbitration proceedings and (2) that
where a case involves questions requiring technical knowledge,
it may be to the advantage of the parties to have them deter-
mined by an expert rather than by a judge who has had no
opportunity to study the subject. In view of the fact that the
parties are not put to any expense in securing the services of a
judge, it is doubtful if, so far as cheapness is concerned, there is
any decided advantage in favor of arbitration; in fact, when all
of the expenses are taken into consideration, it will be found that
many cases can be more economically disposed of by litigation
than by arbitration. While there is a prevailing impression that
arbitration is the cheaper, this is due to the fact that, when
arbitration was not compulsory, disputes settled in this way were
only those of comparatively little importance where the parties
were on friendly terms. Where an arbitration under the statute
involves a mass of detail and where a bitter spirit develops, the
cost will undoubtedly accumulate just as it would in a lawsuit
involving the same subject matter, with the further disadvantage
that the arbitrators will undoubtedly be more liberal in admitting
evidence and in granting delays than -ill a court.
The principle of arbitration is, in substance, no more than
allowing the parties to select and pay their own arbiter rather
than to have one thrust upon them by the government. While
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the passage of the Federal Act is beneficial, if it does no more
than to compel the full observance of agreements deliberately
entered into, it can by no means be relied upon as a solution of
all litigious matters. If due consideration is given before an
arbitration agreement is entered into, if the arbitrator is care-
fully chosen, if the procedure under the Act is carefully studied,
and if the parties are sincere in their desire to have the contro-
versy determined on its merits, then a statutory arbitration will
be a success.
